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2213 
Originalism as a Constraint on Judges 
William Baude† 
One of Justice Antonin Scalia’s greatest legacies is his 
promotion of constitutional originalism. He employed the 
interpretive philosophy on the bench and argued for it in print1 
and in speeches around the country. (Indeed, one of Scalia’s 
speeches about originalism at The University of Chicago in 
20032 was formative in provoking my own thinking on the 
subject.) 
One important feature of Scalia’s particular arguments for 
originalism was constraint—the idea that originalism was 
centrally a way, the best way, to constrain judicial decision-
making, whereas nonoriginalist theories would essentially 
license judges to make up constitutional law as they went along. 
This motif appeared in various passages of his writing. For 
instance, he described as one of the chief virtues of originalism 
that it was “more compatible with the nature and purpose of a 
Constitution in a democratic system,” because: 
The purpose of constitutional guarantees—and in particular 
those constitutional guarantees of individual rights that are 
at the center of this controversy—is precisely to prevent the 
law from reflecting certain changes in original values that 
the society adopting the Constitution thinks fundamentally 
undesirable. Or, more precisely, to require the society to 
devote to the subject the long and hard consideration 
                                                
 † Neubauer Family Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law 
School. I appreciate helpful and timely comments from Samuel Bray, Jud Campbell, 
Jonathan Mitchell, Richard Primus, Richard Re, Stephen Sachs, Lawrence Solum, and 
the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review, as well as research support from 
the SNR Denton Fund and the Alumni Faculty Fund. 
 1 See generally, for example, Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U 
Cin L Rev 849 (1989); Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts (Thomson/West 2012); Antonin Scalia, A Matter of 
Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton 1997) (Amy Gutmann, ed). 
 2 See Andrew Moesel, Justice Scalia Speaks at Law School (Chicago Maroon, May 
9, 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/WQ3K-SZYP. 
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required for a constitutional amendment before those 
particular values can be cast aside.3 
On the other hand, he argued, “the central practical defect 
of nonoriginalism is fundamental and irreparable: the 
impossibility of achieving any consensus on what, precisely, is to 
replace original meaning, once that is abandoned.”4 He 
elaborated: 
If the law is to make any attempt at consistency and 
predictability, surely there must be general agreement not 
only that judges reject one exegetical approach 
(originalism), but that they adopt another. And it is hard to 
discern any emerging consensus among the nonoriginalists 
as to what this might be.5 
The central theme here is that originalism constrains judges 
from simply following popular pressures and, conversely, that 
nonoriginalists will not be able to produce a consistent and 
predictable system. Originalism may not be perfect on this score, 
but it is, Scalia said, the lesser evil. 
In later work with Professor Bryan Garner, Scalia more 
explicitly emphasized the constraint of his methods of 
interpretation. “[S]ound interpretive conventions,” they wrote, 
“will narrow the range of acceptable judicial decision-making 
and acceptable argumentation” and “will curb—even reverse—
the tendency of judges to imbue authoritative texts with their 
own policy preferences.”6 
But time comes for both men and theoretical arguments. In 
this short Essay, I honor Justice Scalia with two observations 
about originalism and constraint. The first is that originalist 
scholars today are much more equivocal about the importance 
and nature of constraining judges. This is a point that may be 
obvious to those steeped in the latest originalist theory, but 
apparently cannot be stated often enough or clearly enough to 
those who are not. 
The second observation, which relates to the first, is that 
the concept of constraint is ambiguous in several respects and 
that originalism may be better at some kinds of constraint than 
others. In particular, I emphasize the difference between 
                                                
 3 Scalia, 57 U Cin L Rev at 862 (cited in note 1) (emphasis omitted). 
 4 Id at 862–63. 
 5 Id at 855. 
 6 Scalia and Garner, Reading Law at xxviii (cited in note 1). 
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external constraints, which help others to judge the interpreter, 
and internal constraints, which focus on allowing the interpreter 
to constrain himself or herself. As reflected and refined in 
modern scholarship, originalism may not be terribly good at the 
former, but it may be much better at the latter. In other words, 
originalism can still have constraining power, but mostly for 
those who seek to be bound. 
I.  THE DEATH OF CONSTRAINT? 
Critics of originalism have leveled sustained, and sometimes 
persuasive, arguments against the justification of originalism as 
a constraint on judges. For instance, in a book-length treatment 
and critique of originalism, The Failed Promise of Originalism, 
Professor Frank Cross attempts to empirically study “[a] key argu-
ment for originalism,” namely, “its ability to restrain willful 
judging.”7 He concludes that “reliance on originalist sources is 
not [ ] particularly constraining, so justices exercise their 
ideological preferences in cases using originalism as much as in 
other decisions.”8 
But the target of these critiques is most readily found in the 
work of older originalists, like Professor Raoul Berger, Judge 
Robert Bork, and Justice Scalia.9 With Scalia’s passing, these 
versions of the constraint argument no longer have a clear 
champion.10 
By contrast, many modern originalists have tended to de-
emphasize the importance of constraining judges, relying instead 
on other arguments—that originalism is normatively desirable 
for other reasons,11 that it is an account of the true meaning of 
the constitutional text,12 or that it is required by our law.13 
                                                
 7 Frank B. Cross, The Failed Promise of Originalism 170 (Stanford Law 2013). 
 8 Id at 189. 
 9 See id at 11–12, 15–16, 19–20. See also, for example, Peter J. Smith, The Marshall 
Court and the Originalist’s Dilemma, 90 Minn L Rev 612, 621 (2006) (discussing works 
by Scalia, Berger’s book Federalism: The Founders’ Design, Bork’s book The Tempting of 
America: The Political Seduction of the Law, and Professor John Hart Ely’s book 
Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review). 
 10 See Gary Lawson, Reflections of an Empirical Reader (or: Could Fleming Be Right 
This Time?), 96 BU L Rev 1457, 1472 (2016) (“Old originalists, such as Raoul Berger and 
Robert Bork (at least before 1990), did not talk as I do. They did not discuss 
epistemology, concepts, communication, and the philosophy of language. They discussed 
such things as judges, democracy, constraint, and authority.”) (citation omitted). Note 
that, in light of the importance of this temporal change, my citations in this piece largely 
focus on originalist work published in the last decade or so. 
 11 See, for example, John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and 
the Good Constitution 19–21 (Harvard 2013); Lawrence B. Solum, The Constraint 
02 BAUDE_ESS_FLIP (PJF) (DO NOT DELETE) 12/11/2017  9:58 AM 
2017] Originalism as a Constraint on Judges 2216 
 
For instance, originalist Professors John McGinnis and 
Michael Rappaport write that while “the argument that 
originalism offers clearer rules to constrain judges than other 
interpretive approaches contains some truth,” it “may not be 
enough to sustain the case for originalism.”14 Rather, “if 
constraint is the overriding objective, non-originalist doctrine 
may sometimes provide more constrained rules than the original 
meaning.”15 
Professor Gary Lawson, also an originalist, writes more 
skeptically: “If constraint and certainty are the goals, 
originalism is a relatively poor way to achieve it compared to 
numerous other methodologies.”16 Professor John Harrison, an 
originalist, concurs that he is “deeply skeptical of the capacity of 
any methodology,” originalism included, “to constrain any 
interpreter,” but adds that he “do[es] not think it is very 
important” whether originalism constrains or not.17 
Another originalist, Professor Christopher Green, rejects the 
importance of constraint even more profoundly, arguing that 
originalism is not undermined even if the original meaning is 
“difficult to unearth,” “enigmatic,”18 and fails “to produce unique 
and indisputable answers to legal questions.”19 As Green puts it: 
“The purpose of my originalism, at any rate, is simply to get the 
constitutional truthmaker right, whatever dispute that might 
engender.”20 Similarly, originalist Professor Randy Barnett 
states that “the new originalism that is widely accepted by most 
originalists today is not an enterprise in constraining judges, 
                                                                                                             
Principle: Original Meaning and Constitutional Practice *58–83 (unpublished 
manuscript, Mar 24, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/KN5Y-NDC8. 
 12 Lawson, 96 BU L Rev at 1458–64 (cited in note 10). 
 13 See generally, for example, William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 Colum 
L Rev 2349 (2015); Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 Harv 
J L & Pub Pol 817 (2015); William Baude and Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of 
Interpretation, 130 Harv L Rev 1079 (2017); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski and Kevin C. Walsh, 
Enduring Originalism, 105 Georgetown L J 97 (2016). 
 14 John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of 
Originalism, 101 Nw U L Rev 383, 383 (2007). 
 15 Id at 384. 
 16 Gary Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No Legitimacy . . . No Problem: 
Originalism and the Limits of Legal Theory, 64 Fla L Rev 1551, 1554 (2012). 
 17 John Harrison, On the Hypotheses That Lie at the Foundations of Originalism, 31 
Harv J L & Pub Pol 473, 473–74 (2008). 
 18 Christopher R. Green, Constitutional Truthmakers, 32 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & 
Pub Pol *17 (forthcoming 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/HXQ6-ST4N. 
 19 Id at *18, quoting Andrew Koppelman, Originalism, Abortion, and the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 112 Colum L Rev 1917, 1919 (2012). 
 20 Green, 32 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at *18 (cited in note 18). 
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but an enterprise in determining what the writing really 
means.”21 
Thus, it may seem as if the argument that originalism is 
justified because it will eliminate judicial discretion has been 
refuted by originalism’s critics and abandoned by its defenders. 
The most explicit recognition of this shift comes from Professor 
Thomas Colby, who writes that while “[j]udicial constraint” was 
once the “heart and soul” of originalism, the theory has since 
“sold its soul to gain respect and adherents.”22 The new 
incarnation of originalism, Colby writes, has “left behind more 
than just the theoretical flaws of its predecessor. It has also 
effectively sacrificed the Old Originalism’s promise of judicial 
constraint. The very changes that make the New Originalism 
theoretically defensible also strip it of any pretense of a power to 
constrain judges to a meaningful degree.”23 Scalia’s constraint 
argument, it may seem, is dead. 
But perhaps things are not so simple. One of the most 
important modern theorists of originalism, Professor Lawrence 
Solum, emphasizes the “Constraint Principle.”24 This is the 
normative argument that original meaning ought to constrain 
constitutional practice, for reasons derived from legitimacy and 
the rule of law.25 Solum’s picture of constraint is nuanced, 
perhaps more so than Scalia’s. He need not and does not assume 
that originalism eliminates all judicial construction.26 But if 
originalism could not constrain judges at all, these normative 
arguments would not work. So the question remains—does 
originalism impose a meaningful constraint on judges?27 
                                                
 21 Randy E. Barnett, The Golden Mean between Kurt & Dan: A Moderate Reading 
of the Ninth Amendment, 56 Drake L Rev 897, 909 (2008). 
 22 Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 Georgetown L J 713, 
714–15 (2011). For a sample denial that originalism has sold its soul, see Stephen E. 
Sachs, Saving Originalism’s Soul (Library of Law and Liberty, Dec 17, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/RJ6E-CRU8 (“The soul of originalism is a method, not a collection of 
results.”). 
 23 Colby, 99 Georgetown L J at 714 (cited in note 22). See also Jeremy K. Kessler 
and David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle Theory of Legal Theories, 
83 U Chi L Rev 1819, 1846–47 (2016). 
 24 See generally Solum, The Constraint Principle (cited in note 11). 
 25 Id at *58–83. 
 26 Id at *24–28. For Solum’s disagreement with Scalia on this point, compare Scalia 
and Garner, Reading Law at 13–15 (cited in note 1), with Lawrence B. Solum, 
Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 Fordham L Rev 453, 483–88 (2013). 
 27 See Colby, 99 Georgetown L J at 751 (cited in note 22) (“New Originalists tend to 
argue that, although their theory does not completely eliminate judicial subjectivity and 
the potential for judicial mischief, it is still meaningfully constraining, at least in 
comparison to the alternatives.”). 
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II.  IT DEPENDS ON WHAT YOU MEAN BY CONSTRAINT 
It is not entirely clear what it means to ask whether 
originalism, or any methodology, “constrains” judicial decision-
making. It is therefore not clear whether originalism 
accomplishes it, or whether it would be a good thing if it did. So 
before interring the importance of originalism as a constraint, 
one should pause to see what that might mean. (Before going 
any further, though, it is worth one terminological 
clarification—I follow Professor Colby and others in using 
“judicial constraint” to refer to “promising to narrow the 
discretion of judges” while reserving “judicial restraint” to refer 
to “deference to legislative majorities.”)28 
First of all, there is the question whether any methodology 
at all can constrain decision-making, or whether methodologies 
and constraint are simply inapt, like asking whether grocery 
stores help one lose weight. There are at least two reasons to 
think they might be so inapt. One is that methodologies are not 
self-applying or self-enforcing. So no methodology is 
constraining in the sense that it can leap out of the law reviews 
and force judges to use it or even keep them from deviating from 
it once they have started.29 
The other is that the performance of an interpretive 
methodology might be related to the materials it interprets. If 
the Constitution itself results in a lot of judicial discretion, then 
the methodology that truthfully enforces the Constitution will 
result in a lot of judicial discretion. But it is not clear whether 
that fault (if it is a fault) should be laid at the feet of the 
methodology or the Constitution.30 Methodologies don’t 
constrain, one might say; constitutions constrain. 
But let us put these aside for a moment. Even so, there are 
further ambiguities: There is a question of how forceful of a 
constraint a methodology imposes. Does it impose a single right 
answer to the legal question at hand? Does it narrow down the 
                                                
 28 Id. See also Solum, 82 Fordham L Rev at 524–25 (cited in note 26); Randy J. Kozel, 
Original Meaning and the Precedent Fallback, 68 Vand L Rev 105, 112 n 26 (2015). 
 29 See Anthony D’Amato, Can Any Legal Theory Constrain Any Judicial Decision?, 
43 U Miami L Rev 513, 522–23 (1989) (“The reason theories work is that we expect them 
to work. But the subtlety here is that we can at best expect them to ‘work’ as theories; it 
is irrational for us to expect them to work in the sense of constraining practice.”). 
 30 See Green, 32 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at *17–20 (cited in note 19); 
Steven G. Calabresi and Gary Lawson, The Rule of Law as a Law of Law, 90 Notre Dame 
L Rev 483, 487, 504 (2014). To be sure, others might respond that a Constitution doesn’t 
do anything until it is interpreted. 
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range of right answers, but not necessarily to one? Does it 
provide a process or set of considerations for giving the right 
answer, even if different people applying the method might 
legitimately come to different conclusions? And there is the 
question of the range of cases in which the constraint operates. 
In particular, does it apply in all constitutional cases, or only a 
subset of them? 
These different axes suggest that constraint is not a single, 
scalar variable. One methodology might produce unique right 
answers in a range of cases and no guidance in another range of 
cases. Is it less constraining than a methodology that produces a 
limited range of right answers, but in every single case? We 
could stipulate either type of constraint to be greater than the 
other, but ultimately these points suggest that we must define 
constraint more precisely before joining issue on how much a 
methodology does it, or whether it is a good thing. 
I mention all of these points as a preliminary matter to one 
more distinction, one that may be the most underappreciated 
distinction between different types of constraint: how the 
constraint operates. 
Consider two types of constraint: external and internal. An 
external constraint helps those who wish to judge the judge. If 
the judge misapplies (or ignores) the constraint, other people 
will be able to tell. Perhaps they will shame him, punish him, or 
even defy him. As Judge Frank Easterbrook puts it (in the 
preface to Scalia and Garner’s book): 
Interpretation is a human enterprise, which cannot be 
carried out algorithmically by an expert system on a 
computer. But discretion can be hedged in by rules, such 
as those that this book covers in detail, and misuse of 
these rules by a crafty or willful judge then can be 
exposed as an abuse of power. A more latitudinarian 
approach to interpretation, by contrast, makes it hard to 
see when the judge has succumbed to the Dark Side of 
Tenure—which, like the Dark Side of The Force in Star 
Wars, is marked by self-indulgence.31 
But that is not the only mechanism by which a constraint might 
operate. A constraint might also operate as an internal 
constraint, one that helps the willing judge. If the judge 
                                                
 31 Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword, in Scalia and Garner, Reading Law xxi, xxiii 
(cited in note 1). 
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faithfully applies the constraint, it will help him to decide the 
case by telling how to get to the answer. 
In principle, a constraint could operate in both respects, but 
some constraints will be more effective internally than exter-
nally. If a legal methodology is complicated or turns on 
questions of judgment, it may be hard for others to distinguish 
between honest disagreements on a question of applying the law 
and perhaps dishonest ones on whether to follow the law at all. 
This distinction between internal and external constraint helps 
paint two very different pictures of originalism as a constraint 
on judges. 
A. Originalism as External Constraint 
In one picture, originalism might strive to act as a strict 
external constraint. Through its force, scope, and simplicity, it 
serves as a way of controlling a judiciary run amok. This picture 
assumes that originalism will generally produce a single answer 
to disputed questions of constitutional law and that it will do so 
across many different kinds of cases. Moreover, it assumes that 
it will do so in a way that is externally enforceable. If a judge 
has deviated from originalism, others will be able to tell. 
For instance, Professor Berger invoked the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s “framers’ intention,” arguing that “[t]o ‘interpret’ 
the Amendment in diametrical opposition to that intention is to 
rewrite the Constitution.”32 He also stressed the importance of 
what I would call external constraint. He wrote that “[a] prime 
task of scholarship” like his was “to heighten public awareness 
that the Court has been overleaping its bounds.”33 And he re-
jected as contrary to “one of the most fundamental premises of 
our constitutional system”34 the idea of placing our faith in the 
judiciary’s “own sense of self-restraint.”35 And to emphasize the 
message of a judiciary run amok, the very title of his book was 
Government by Judiciary. 
If this was ever the kind of constraint that originalism 
promised, one can see why it no longer seems so likely to do so. 
A version of originalism that focused strictly on the original 
                                                
 32 Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment 457 (Liberty Fund 2d ed 1977). 
 33 Id at 464. He also advocated more aggressive enforcement, such as impeachment. 
Id at 463. See also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Checking the Court, 10 NYU J L & Liberty 
18, 67–90 (2016). 
 34 Berger, Government by Judiciary at 463 (cited in note 32). 
 35 Id, quoting United States v Butler, 297 US 1, 79 (1936) (Stone dissenting). 
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intent or originally expected applications of the text might have 
been able to deliver such a constraint over a certain domain 
(applications actually foreseeable by the Framers). On that 
version, if the death penalty or congressional chaplains or what 
have you existed when the constitutional provision was enacted, 
that is all we need to know now.36 
But originalists do not adhere to this version of 
originalism—for good reason37—and instead focus on the public 
meaning or legal meaning of the text. This sort of inquiry is 
comparatively less likely to supply broad external constraints. 
For instance, there are disputes or confusion about the proper 
level of generality at which to read various provisions of the 
constitutional text.38 And while these disputes have good 
answers,39 they make it harder for originalism to serve as a 
consistent external constraint. To be sure, some forms of strict 
textualism, with relatively few sources of extrinsic evidence, can 
be relatively effective as an external constraint. As Professor 
Alexander Volokh has put it, such a method has a “high 
implausibility cost,” meaning that it renders more outcomes 
facially implausible.40 On the other hand, the more a theory 
introduces extrinsic sources, canons, and methods, the less 
effective that theory will be as an external constraint, because it 
will have an increasingly “low implausibility cost,” with more 
interpretations potentially plausible.41 
Furthermore, many versions of originalism acknowledge 
substantial “construction zones” in which “the meaning of ‘the 
constitutional text does not provide determinate answers to 
                                                
 36 Consider Steven D. Smith, That Old-Time Originalism, in Grant Huscroft and 
Bradley W. Miller, eds, The Challenge of Originalism: Theories of Constitutional 
Interpretation 223 (Cambridge 2011). 
 37 See Sachs, Saving Originalism’s Soul (cited in note 22) (“But the old originalism 
was abandoned for a reason, namely that it was wrong.”). 
 38 See generally, for example, Peter J. Smith, Originalism and Level of Generality, 
51 Ga L Rev 485 (2017). 
 39 See, for example, Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense–Reference 
Distinction, 50 SLU L J 555, 563–74 (2006); Lawrence Solum, Smith on Originalism & 
Levels of Generality (Legal Theory Blog, Apr 3, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/4K4K 
-B3E7. 
 40 Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods: A Positive Theory of Judges 
and Everyone Else, 83 NYU L Rev 769, 795–96 (2008) (“For instance, textualism may be 
a method with a high implausibility cost if text tends to be determinate, or if Webster’s 
Second or the Oxford English Dictionary is the only acceptable dictionary.”). 
 41 Id at 796–97 (“Conversely, [textualism] may have a low implausibility cost if all 
dictionaries and canons (both textual and substantive) are fair game.”). 
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constitutional questions.’”42 In these zones, “officials must act—
by assumption—‘on the basis of normative considerations that 
are not fully determined by the communicative content of the 
constitutional text.’”43 
Even originalists who argue that those construction zones 
can be narrowed or filled in through other originalist 
arguments—such as the deployment of appropriate default 
rules,44 the use of the original legal methods or original 
interpretive rules,45 or the use of what Professor Stephen Sachs 
and I have called the “law of interpretation”46—would likely 
acknowledge that the outputs of those methods remain quite 
disputed. There is no canonical book of original methods, no 
codex containing all of the law of interpretation.47 And even if 
there were, those methods would be subject to dispute in their 
application. These disputes are not intractable or unresolvable, 
by any means, but their resolution requires substantial research 
and legal judgment. The same seems to be true for other 
candidate theories of construction.48 These theories may each be 
deeply coherent, but it is both costly and difficult for an outside 
observer to say at a glance whether the original meaning has 
been followed in a given case. And this, in turn, makes it harder 
to apply external constraints to originalist judges. 
These difficulties are exacerbated by other important 
theoretical advances in originalism. Just to name three, 
                                                
 42 Baude and Sachs, 130 Harv L Rev at 1128 (cited in note 13), quoting Solum, 82 
Fordham L Rev at 458 (cited in note 26). 
 43 Baude and Sachs, 130 Harv L Rev at 1128 (cited in note 13), quoting Lawrence 
B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 Notre 
Dame L Rev 1, 5 (2015). 
 44 See, for example, Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules 
for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 Nw U L Rev 857, 915 (2009); Gary Lawson, Legal 
Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19 Harv J L & Pub Pol 411, 424–28 (1996). 
 45 See generally, for example, John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, 
Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case against 
Construction, 103 Nw U L Rev 751 (2009). 
 46 Baude and Sachs, 130 Harv L Rev at 1097–1120 (cited in note 13). 
 47 Scalia and Garner, Reading Law at 9 (cited in note 1) (“The reader may well 
wonder: Where are all these interpretive canons to be found? Are they tidily collected 
somewhere in a code? Generally, no.”). But see id (suggesting that the book was “the first 
modern attempt . . . to collect and arrange only the valid canons”). 
 48 See, for example, Randy E. Barnett and Evan Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: 
The Judicial Duty of Good-Faith Constitutional Construction *41–62 (working paper, 
2017), archived at http://perma.cc/TXH4-MEKR. The most easily applicable might be 
default rules, such as those discussed in the sources cited in note 44. 
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originalists generally countenance some use of precedent,49 
generally have some way of distinguishing between the 
applications of a text (which can change) and the meaning of a 
text (which cannot),50 and may have some way of taking account 
of unwritten background principles or assumptions.51 Each of 
these additional variations makes application of the theory more 
complicated and more subject to good-faith dispute, and 
therefore harder to subject to collective constraint or discipline. 
None of this is to say that originalism lacks any externally 
constraining force. It may well still be better than some other 
methodologies. For instance, Sachs and I have previously 
alleged that it compares favorably to “‘pragmatism’—under 
which it’s wickedly difficult to tell whether its practitioners are 
doing it right or wrong.”52 But there are also probably 
methodologies that are still better at external constraint. 
Perhaps theories centered around heavy deference to other 
branches or strong stare decisis, for example, could make it 
easier to judge the judiciary’s behavior, because it is 
comparatively transparent when a law is being struck down or a 
precedent is being overruled.53 In short, originalism may not be 
the best tool to constrain the wayward judge. 
B. Originalism as Internal Constraint 
But consider a different picture of originalism as constraint. 
The target of this constraint is not the wayward judge, but the 
                                                
 49 See Baude, 115 Colum L Rev at 2358–61 (cited in note 13) (reviewing originalist 
scholarship on precedent). 
 50 See Green, 50 SLU L J at 559–60 (cited in note 39); Jack M. Balkin, Living 
Originalism 23, 27–32 (Belknap 2011). 
 51 See generally, for example, Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 Geo 
Wash L Rev 1813 (2012); Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption about 
Constitutional Assumptions, 103 Nw U L Rev 615 (2009). 
 52 William Baude and Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism’s Bite, 20 Green Bag 2d 103, 
105 (2016). See also Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution (and How 
Not To), 115 Yale L J 2037, 2061–62 (2006) (“[I]t is easier to spot an errant would-be 
originalist interpretation than an errant nonoriginalist . . . interpretation. The existence 
of reasonably firm criteria makes it easier to check up on originalist interpretations for 
the soundness of their reasoning and their adherence to correct principles.”). 
 53 This transparency exists unless, perhaps, the judiciary can avail itself of 
aggressive forms of “interpreting” statutes to avoid invalidating them, see Caleb Nelson, 
Avoiding Constitutional Questions versus Avoiding Unconstitutionality, 128 Harv L Rev 
F 331, 333–39 (2015), or “narrowing” precedents to avoid overruling them, see Richard 
M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 Colum L Rev 1861, 1867–74 
(2014). 
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puzzled judge.54 This judge would like to be able to apply the law 
without importing nonlegal considerations and is searching for a 
method that will help her do it. Even if the method is suffi-
ciently complicated or involves sufficient discretion, such that it 
is hard for outsiders to use the method as a way of monitoring 
judicial behavior, it can still serve to discipline and guide an 
individual judge who chooses to apply it. As Professor Green has 
put it, “If it matters to no one else, the existence of an external 
legal standard surely matters to the ultimate interpreter; the 
phenomenology of making the law on one’s own is surely quite 
different from that of interpreting someone else’s law.”55 
In what sense might this be called “constraint,” and why 
might any constraints of this sort be desirable? One function of 
this kind of internal constraint is to wall off or reduce certain 
considerations that might be tempting, but undesirable.56 For 
instance, a judge told only to “do the right thing” or “use your 
judgment” might import political and even partisan 
considerations in a way that might be undesirable. Or imagine a 
judge who is deciding whether a category of searches is 
permissible under the Fourth Amendment and who wishes to 
avoid the hindsight bias of knowing what the search at hand 
turned up. Without an internal constraint, even a well-meaning 
judge might not be able to resist the power of hindsight. 
Another related function is providing a resource for treating 
like cases alike and different cases differently. Such equal 
treatment is often taken to be a central requirement of fairness 
and the rule of law. But as the legal realists loved to point out, 
all cases are alike in some respects and different in some 
respects. It depends on the axis of similarity and difference. 
A methodology that imposes internal constraint gives judges 
an answer for what counts as a like case and what counts as a 
different one. Almost any methodology that is minimally 
constraining will tell a judge that he ought not distinguish a 
previous case on the grounds that it was decided on a Tuesday 
but today is Wednesday.57 And a truly constraining methodology 
                                                
 54 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 40 (Oxford 3d ed 2012) (“Why should not 
law be equally if not more concerned with the ‘puzzled man’ or ‘ignorant man’ who is 
willing to do what is required, if only he can be told what it is?”). 
 55 Green, 32 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at *10 (cited in note 19). 
 56 See William Baude and Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U 
Chi L Rev 539, 552–54 (2017). 
 57 Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J App Prac & Process  
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can go further, suggesting what the relevant axis is—for 
instance, whether a given search invaded a positive-law right,58 or 
whether a given punishment was painful and contrary to long 
usage.59 
For instance, imagine a judge confronted, a few years ago, 
with the controversy over whether the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires states to allow same-sex couples to marry. And imagine 
that the judge wishes to be constrained. She thinks it would be 
wrong to impose her own views of marriage on the country, and 
therefore seeks a legal criterion that does not depend on her own 
views and that will guide her in deciding whether or not to 
extend the various arguments of Loving v Virginia60 and 
Lawrence v Texas.61 If originalism provides a way to determine 
the original legal force of the Fourteenth Amendment—to 
determine the scope of the rights it protects and the nature of its 
equality guarantee—then originalism can supply the internal 
constraint the judge seeks. And originalism can do so even if it is 
not so clear-cut as to provide an external constraint. Even if the 
question is a fairly debatable one, there is “[n]o reason [ ] why 
we cannot conclude for ourselves that one side has the better of 
it, even if by a nose, and even while admitting that a disagreeing 
colleague could see it the other way.”62 
                                                                                                             
219, 223 (1999): 
One party cites a previous opinion as binding precedent. The other party says 
it is distinguishable, and, upon being asked why, says that the previous case 
was argued on a Tuesday, whereas this case is being argued on a Wednesday. 
This circumstance, admittedly a factual difference, is obviously irrelevant. 
Why? Because the factual difference—the day on which the case is being 
argued—has nothing to do with the governing legal principles. The example is 
extreme, and deliberately so, but I believe it illustrates the point. 
See also Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional 
Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 Vill L Rev 273, 278–79 (2008). 
 58 See generally William Baude and James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the 
Fourth Amendment, 129 Harv L Rev 1821 (2016). See also Baude and Sachs, 20 Green 
Bag 2d at 107 (cited in note 52). 
 59 See John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth 
Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 Nw U L Rev 1739, 1745 (2008) (“[T]he 
word ‘unusual’ was a term of art that referred to government practices that are 
contrary to ‘long usage’ or ‘immemorial usage.’”). See also Samuel L. Bray, “Necessary 
and Proper” and “Cruel and Unusual”: Hendiadys in the Constitution, 102 Va L Rev 
687, 712–13 (2016). 
 60 388 US 1 (1967). 
 61 539 US 558 (2003). 
 62 Neil M. Gorsuch, Of Lions and Bears, Judges and Legislators, and the Legacy of 
Justice Scalia, 66 Case W Reserve L Rev 905, 917 (2016). 
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It is more plausible that originalism fits this second picture 
of constraint—at least if it is supplemented with a theory that 
narrows or fills in construction zones. Even if such theories are 
sufficiently complicated that they do not easily yield consensus 
or rule most interpretations out of bounds as implausible, they 
still provide a method that can be divorced from various nonlegal 
considerations. Originalism can provide a sort of procedural 
constraint by pushing aside some arguably illegitimate 
considerations from the judge’s mind; and it can provide an 
internal substantive constraint by helping judges see their way 
toward the right answers. 
On this picture, originalism provides internal constraints by 
going beyond ordinary constitutional pluralism.63 Originalism 
either excludes some methods of constitutional reasoning, 
provides a structure determining when other methods are 
applicable, or both.64 Similarly, originalism—at least as Sachs 
and I have seen it—provides a metric by which claims about 
constitutional law can be judged.65 While that metric may 
sometimes require a great deal of historical research and 
theoretical nuance, it still allows individual interpreters to come 
up with their own best assessments of constitutional meaning. 
And while various forms of originalism may still call for the 
exercise of discretion and normative judgment, they are guided 
in an important way. As Sachs and I have written, “these are 
‘normative’ judgments in the sense that they’re judgments about 
norms—particularly those held by other people—not in the 
sense that they involve first-order normative reasoning about 
what is to be done.”66 
Originalism has this kind of constraint by dint of having a 
certain kind of “constitutional truthmaker”—an ultimate cri-
terion by virtue of which constitutional claims are true or false. 
Having such a truthmaker at all is the first step toward internal 
constraint. Further constraint comes from the nature of 
originalism’s truthmaker. The fact that it is largely removed 
                                                
 63 See Jamal Greene, The Age of Scalia, 130 Harv L Rev 144, 151 (2016) (“[I]t is in 
fact easy to discern a consensus as to the alternative to originalism. . . . [T]he alternative 
is pluralism.”). 
 64 Baude, 115 Colum L Rev at 2353 (cited in note 13) (“Pluralists argue that our 
practice is a set of competing methods, none of which dominates the others. Whereas 
those pluralist conceptions are flat, under my view they are hierarchically structured, 
with originalism at the top of the hierarchy.”) (citation omitted). 
 65 Baude and Sachs, 20 Green Bag 2d at 104–06 (cited in note 52). 
 66 Baude and Sachs, 130 Harv L Rev at 1145 (cited in note 13) (emphasis omitted). 
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from the most salient moral issues of the day can be a virtue 
here. It means that applying originalism is a way to limit the 
relevance of political or moral criteria that judges may feel an 
obligation to push aside. 
To be sure, originalism does not lay unique claim to internal 
constraint. Any constitutional theory with a single truthmaker 
can lay some such claim, and there are important nonoriginalist 
theories that might qualify.67 But other common competitors to 
originalism, such as unstructured pluralism or incrementalism, 
may not. 
Interestingly, while Scalia has been widely read to favor 
the external picture of constraint, there are passages in his 
writing that seemed to demonstrate some awareness of 
internal constraint, as well. For instance, in an early 
concurring opinion in James B. Beam Distilling Co v Georgia,68 
he described the Constitution’s “judicial power” as being “the 
power ‘to say what the law is,’ not the power to change it.”69 He 
seemed candid about the internal nature of this constraint, 
adding: 
I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to 
be unaware that judges in a real sense “make” law. But 
they make it as judges make it, which is to say as though 
they were “finding” it—discerning what the law is, rather 
than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will 
tomorrow be.70 
In later writing, he disparaged another judge’s attempt to 
“escape from theorizing” in constitutional law and rely on 
“[w]isdom” and “good sense” in terms that emphasized internal 
constraint.71 Scalia professed “great fear” that such a judge who 
                                                
 67 See Green, 32 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at *23–25 (cited in note 19) 
(listing examples). A particularly promising nonoriginalist single-truthmaker theory is 
described in Mitchell N. Berman, Our Principled Constitution (University of Pennsylvania 
Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No 17-15, Mar 15, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/5UQV-SQXN (attempting to derive a positivist system of constitutional 
principles from social facts). 
 68 501 US 529 (1991). 
 69 Id at 549 (Scalia concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted), quoting Marbury 
v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 70 Beam, 501 US at 549 (Scalia concurring in the judgment). Professor William N. 
Eskridge Jr suggested that Scalia’s Tanner Lectures, later published as A Matter of Inter-
pretation, cited in note 1, “can be read as a manifesto for such an ‘as-though’ philosophy 
of statutory interpretation.” William N. Eskridge Jr, Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 
Mich L Rev 1509, 1556 (1998). 
 71 Scalia and Garner, Reading Law at 27–28 (cited in note 1). 
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attempts to escape theory “will lack an objective basis for 
judging. Do the injunctions ‘be modest’ and ‘be restrained’ mean 
always deferring to the wishes of the legislature? And if not 
always, then how are the appropriate occasions to be 
identified?”72 It seems that the problem Scalia was concerned 
with was the lack of any actual criterion, or “objective basis.” 
Similarly, when he praised originalism for “establish[ing] a 
historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from the 
preferences of the judge himself,”73 he seems to be speaking in 
terms of internal constraint.74 The very mechanism of internal 
constraint is the creation of a conceptually separate criterion for 
judging—something the judge can use to guide his decisions, if he 
wishes to. 
III.  IS CONSTRAINT IMPORTANT? 
Whatever kind of constraint originalism imposes—internal, 
external, both, neither—there remains the question whether we 
should care. Despite what I have written above, I think there 
are plausible arguments that we should not. As several of the 
newer originalists have written, if we start with the premise that 
the Constitution is binding law, then perhaps our task should 
simply be to read the Constitution and do what it says.75 
Sometimes it may result in constraints, and sometimes it may 
not. 
Even if one complicates this picture by adding that there are 
multiple ways to read a text, one might again say76 that the 
originalist task is not to pick among these readings on primarily 
normative grounds, but rather to pick the one that is part of our 
legal system, which happens to proceed in continuity from the 
Framers’ law. And this seems not to turn on whether a 
methodology is constraining—we could achieve far stronger 
constraints, at least as an external matter, by telling judges to 
flip a coin77 or to always rule in favor of the government.78 
                                                
 72 Id at 28. 
 73 Scalia, 57 U Cin L Rev at 864 (cited in note 1). 
 74 See John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Idea of Judicial Restraint, 115 Mich 
L Rev 747, 749–50 (2017) (“I contend that an insistence upon decisional justifications 
external to the judges’ will, and not a naked preference for rules, provided the central 
grounding for all of Justice Scalia’s commitments.”). 
 75 See sources cited in note 30. 
 76 Indeed, I have said so. See generally Baude, 115 Colum L Rev 2349 (cited in note 13). 
 77 Sachs, 38 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 886 (cited in note 13). 
 78 Greene, 130 Harv L Rev at 152 & n 45 (cited in note 63). 
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But even in such positive or authority-based models of 
originalism, there is a role for normative arguments about 
constraint. After all, the decision to follow the Constitution as law, 
and to follow any particular legal rules for interpreting it, still has 
a normative aspect. I have argued (following Professor Richard 
Re) that judges have a prima facie obligation to obey the law, 
and hence the original meaning of the Constitution, because of 
their oath and democratic role.79 But the words “prima facie” 
reveal that this “cannot wholly eliminate” normative 
considerations but rather can only “postpone and transform” 
them.80 If originalism were entirely unconstraining, that might 
still provide a reason to worry that our current legal regime was 
in need of improvement81 and warrants change. 
There is another, more practical point. If a method of 
interpretation provided very little constraint in any sense, we 
might worry that was a clue that our method of interpretation 
was not a very accurate picture of the meaning it was trying to 
capture. We might worry that Professor Colby was right that 
originalism had become so capacious as to lose any meaning—
had become an exercise in theater rather than law. Indeed, we 
might worry that such a method was not law at all. Fortunately, 
however, that charge does not seem to be true of originalism, 
even today. 
Again, this is not to say that its ability to constrain judging 
is the most important thing about originalism. If that were the 
way we chose constitutional theories, we would choose 
something else. But it remains of some importance that 
originalism operates as an internal constraint, that it guides the 
“puzzled” judge. That fact sets originalism aside from what has 
been called its greatest competitor—constitutional pluralism, 
most forms of which fail to contain a single “truthmaker.”82 And 
it suggests that even as originalism has grown more 
sophisticated, it has actually kept some faith with one of Justice 
Scalia’s central insights about interpretation—the importance of 
believing in something larger than yourself. 
                                                
 79 Baude, 115 Colum L Rev at 2393–95 (cited in note 13). See also generally Richard 
M. Re, Promising the Constitution, 110 Nw U L Rev 299 (2016). 
 80 Baude, 115 Colum L Rev at 2394–95 (cited in note 13). 
 81 Assuming, that is, that our Constitution is one worth being constrained by. 
Compare generally Louis Michael Seidman, On Constitutional Disobedience (Oxford 
2012), with Ilan Wurman, A Debt against the Living: An Introduction to Originalism 
(Cambridge 2017). 
 82 Green, 32 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at *21–23 (cited in note 19). 
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